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In discussing the international aspects of hijacking it is necessary to
start with some appreciation of the size of the problem. According to
statistics compiled by the Office of Air Transportation Security of the
U.S. Federal Aviation Administration issued 5 April 1972,1 since 1930
ihere have been reported in all countries of the world 342 instances of
hijacking or attempted hijacking. Of these, 137 involved U.S. aircraft
while the balance of 205 involved aircraft of 58 other countries. Aircraft
hijacking is world-wide and an international problem that has directly
affected the aircraft of 59 countries of the world with numerous other
countries involved in some indirect manner. For instance, many countries
have found themselves the unwilling hosts to uninvited guests seeking
political refuge or possibly only seeking fuel so that the crew of the air-
craft could be compelled to go further. Others have found their airspace
entered by uninvited intruders for whom they must take unusual air traffic
and other safety regulation precautions. Hijacking is thus a crime that has
a special impact on the international community because of its very nature
and it is for this reason that the international community has in the rela-
tively recent past taken action to combat this vicious crime and, at the
urging of some, is contemplating additional measures.
Possibly this forum, the Inter-American Bar Association Meeting in
Quito, Ecuador, is the most appropriate location for us to review what
has been done by the international community to combat hijacking and
to consider further steps which may be necessary.
*Originally presented at the XVII Inter-American Bar Association Biennial
Conference held in Quito, Ecuador, April 24-29, 1972.
**Deputy Assistant Administrator for International Aviation Affairs, Federal
Aviation Administration. B.A., Williams College; LL.B., Harvard. Mr. Boyle, an
authority in International Aviation Law, has served as Chairman and Vice-Chairman
of the U.S. delegation to many international aviation conferences including those
of ICAO and others such as Guadalajara in 1960 and Tokyo in 196.3.
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
AIRCRAFT HIJACKING
The first recorded hijacking of which I am aware is one which in-
volved Ecuador's neighbor to the south - Peru - when in 1930, unsuc-
cessful revolutionaries seized control of an aircraft in order to flee the
country.2 That was a very early forerunner and the crime was not re-
peated until after World War II when beginning in 1947 hijacking became
much more frequent. Possibly the most well known and most frequent
instances of hijacking have been those in which the aircraft is, success-
fully or unsuccessfully, ordered to divert to Cuba. Most but by no means
all of these flights have originated in the U.S.' Thus, the problem of
hijacking is one in which the Western Hemisphere and this Association
has a direct and major interest.
There have been several distinct sources or causes of hijackings.
However most hijackings have been derived from the changing social and
political climates of various areas of the world. The hijackings immediately
following World War II in the late 1940's and early 1950's have been
generally attributed to the social and political changes in Europe following
the end of hostilities.4 According to statistics compiled by the International
Civil Aviation Organization from the period 1947 through 1960 there
were 25 recorded instances of hijackings, most of these in Europe. How-
ever in 1961 this circumstance changed and there began a new series of
hijackings many of them involving the diversion of U.S. registered aircraft
to Cuba. Even these were relatively rare and infrequent until approxi-
mately 1968. Beginning in 1968, there were 19 U.S. aircraft either suc-
cessfully hijacked to Cuba or an attempt to do so was made. In 1969, this
figure was 37; in 1970 -fifteen; 1971 -fourteen; and so far this year
there have been four.5 The rise in the number of hijackings of U.S. reg-
istered aircraft to Cuba reflects generally a rise in the total number of
hijackings worldwide. During the period 1930 through 1967, a total of
37 years, there were 65 hijackings. Beginning in 1968, there were 35
hijackings in that year alone; in 1969- 87; in 1970- 82; in 1971 -
59; and in 1972 to date - 14. It may be significant to note that the
number of hijackings peaked in 1969 with 87, began declining in 1970,
and there was a marked drop in 1971. These lower rates of hijackings
appear to be continuing on the basis of the first quarter of 1972 in which
only 15 hijackings have occurred. 6 The rise and fall of the incidents of
hijackings are, at least in part, coincident with the activities of the inter-
national community in combating this crime. This gives some reason to
hope that the actions already taken have had some influence on what ap-
pears to be a decline in the incidence of hijacking and gives us some
reason to hope for the future. Let us examine what these actions have
been.
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The first action taken by the international community to combat
hijacking was the Tokyo Convention of 1963. This Convention was origi-
nally designed to solve the problems of the commission of crimes on board
aircraft while in flight where for any number of reasons the criminal
might escape punishment. Its principal thrust was to assure that the law
of the State of registry was always applicable to the commission of a crime
on board an aircraft in flight and that the aircraft commander would
have authority to deal with the offender while on board and to turn him
over to the appropriate authorities upon landing. Thereafter, the fate of the
individual would be determined by the application of normal legal process
including extradition treaties but, in any event, the Convention made
certain that the law of the State of registry of the aircraft applied to the
crime in addition to whatever other State might, under their legal systems,
find their law applying.7 The Convention was not originally directed at the
problem of hijacking but because it dealt with the commission of crime
on board aircraft in flight it was admirably suited to be the vehicle for
international action on this subject. The U.S. made the initial proposal to
amend the Tokyo Convention to include a provision dealing with the crime
of hijacking. This was put forward at a meeting of the Legal Subcom-
mittee of the International Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal in
March 1962 and was ultimately incorporated in the draft Convention by
the action of the full Legal Committee at its meeting in Rome in Septem-
ber of 1962 as the joint proposal of the United States and Venezuela.8
The following year, at the Diplomatic Conference in Tokyo, the Conven-
tion was adopted containing provisions dealing with the problem of hi-
jacking in Article 11.
At this early stage of the development of international law on hijack-
ing, it was not possible to either describe the crime or attempt to make the
act an international crime. Thus, the Tokyo Convention was limited to
creating an obligation on States party to the Convention to assume certain
obligations in the case of a person on-board an aircraft in-flight who
"unlawfully" commits by "force or threat thereof" an act of "interference,
seizure or other wrongful exercise of control." This formulation left to
the law of the State undertaking jurisdiction (usually the State of registry)
to determine in accordance with its law what acts were "unlawful" or
"wrongful." 9
The obligations assumed by a State under the Tokyo Convention with
respect to the disposition of the hijacker are also limited reflecting the
fact that at this juncture in the development of the aircraft hijacking
problem, the international community was not yet ready to attempt to
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deal wih the entire problem. Consequently, these obligations are "to take
all appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful
commander or to preserve his control of the aircraft," "to permit the
passengers and crew to continue their journey as soon as practicable" and
"to return the aircraft and cargo to persons lawfully entitled to posses-
sion." 10 The obligations of the State where the aircraft ultimately lands
and the hijacker is in the custody of authorities are not significantly dif-
ferent from those which the Convention provides for the commission of
other crimes on-board the aircraft. That State is obligated to take the
alleged offender into custody (or to take other measures to insure his
presence) for a sufficient length of time for extradition procedures to be
initiated in the event that the custodial State does not undertake criminal
action. It also must make a preliminary inquiry and communicate the
results thereof to interested States which include the State of registry of
the aircraft and the State of nationality of the offender.
Looking back from the vantage point of today, it is obvious that the
Tokyo Convention left a major gap in the international legal system in
attempting to cope with the scourge of aircraft hijacking. There was no
undertaking by anyone to make aircraft hijacking a crime under its na-
tional law, no undertaking to see to it that the crime was one punishable
by severe penalties and most important, no undertaking to either submit
the case for prosecution or to extradite the offender to a State which would
wish to prosecute. Thus, the door was left open so that a State holding
an aircraft hijacker which, for whatever reason, did not wish to prosecute
or extradite was under no obligation to do either. While such action might
in some instances offend the moral sense of the international community
it was not a violation of a legal obligation. 1'
Another reason why the Tokyo Convention was, at least initially,
ineffective was that the ratification of the Convention by a sufficient
number of States to bring it into effect was unfortunately slow. In fact
the U.S., one of the principal sponsors of the Convention, did not file its
instrument of ratification until September 5, 1969. Following the U.S.
ratification of the Convention it quickly acquired the requisite number of
ratifications and came into effect on December 4, 1969. At this time some
51 States are party to the Tokyo Convention.
During the period before the Tokyo Convention came into effect the
international community through the International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation noted the upsurge in the frequency of hijackings already mentioned
and, in the hope that some amelioration of the problem could be obtained
through the widespread application of the Tokyo Convention adopted, at
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the 16th Session of the Assembly of ICAO in Buenos Aires in 1968, a
resolution calling for all States to become party to the Tokyo Convention
as soon as possible. In the meantime, this Resolution urged States to give
effect to the provisions of Article 11 of the Tokyo Convention whether or
not it had been ratified. The Assembly also requested the Council of
ICAO to institute a study of other measures to cope with the problem of
seizure of aircraft.'2
Pursuant to the resolution of the Assembly, the Council of ICAO in
the latter part of 1968 requested its Air Navigation Commission, the
Legal Committee and the Air Transport Committee to undertake an
examination of the problem to determine what if anything could be done to
further protect international aviation from hijacking. As a part of this gen-
eral consideration, the Council adopted a resolution which reinforced the
earlier resolution of the Assembly by calling on all contracting States
to take all possible measures to prevent acts of unlawful seizure of aircraft
and to cooperate with any State whose aircraft has been the subject of such
a seizure.13 This action of the Council was almost immediately followed by
an Extraordinary Session of the Council in January of 1969 convened to
consider the complaint of Lebanon against Israel for action by its armed
forces at Beirut Airport. The Council of ICAO was involved in almost
daily sessions on that subject for many days. Partially as an outgrowth
of these discussions, partly because of the continuing grave threat to the
safety of international aviation, and partly because of the real possibility
that the unabated continuation of crimes of violence directed against
international aviation could undermine public confidence in international
air transport, the Council decided to establish a Committee of the Council
under Article 52 of the Chicago Convention. 14
The major purpose of this committee was to provide a means to give
immediate and continued attention to future acts of unlawful interference
with civil aviation. It consisted of 11 members and almost immediately
began a general series of hearings in which organizations such as the
International Air Transport Association, the International Federation of
Air Line Pilots Association, INTERPOL and other organizations and, in
some cases, governments presented recommendations for action to deter
hijacking."5 As a consequence of these activities of the Committee on
Unlawful Interference, numerous recommendations were made to the
Council and circulated to contracting States."
The next significant act on the international scene designed to cope
with hijacking was the Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of ICAO
held in Montreal in June of 1970. This Assembly was convened at the
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request of ten European States who had been motivated in making the
request by acts of sabotage to aircraft belonging to Austria and to
Switzerland which occurred early in 1970. The agenda of this Assembly
was dedicated entirely to the problem of coping with unlawful interference
of aircraft and included within its scope not only the problem of hijacking
with which the international community up to that time had primarily
been concerned, but also enlarged its scope to encompass the problem of
sabotage. The agenda ultimately adopted called for the development of
adequate security specifications and practices to prevent criminal action
of any kind that might endanger the safety of air transport and included
consideration of arrangements under which those responible for criminal
actions endangering civil air transportation could be brought to justice.1 7
As indicated by that agenda, the actions taken at the Extraordinary Assem-
bly of ICAO ranged across the whole spectrum of preventive measures.
For example, Resolution A17-5 called for the adoption by ICAO States
of measures which, in large part, would implement the Tokyo Convention
by all contracting States of ICAO not merely those who were party to the
Tokyo Convention. Resolution A17-9 called upon contracting States to use
the good offices of ICAO in cases of unlawful interference of aircraft
wherever they considered it appropriate. In Resolution A17-1, popularly
known as the Declaration of Montreal, the Assembly condemned all acts
of violence directed against international aviation aircraft crews, passen.
gers and facilities and called for concerted action on the part of States to
suppress acts which jeopardize the safety and orderly development of
international aviation. In Resolution A17-10 the Assembly drew up and
recommended adoption of specific measures to be taken to protect aircraft,
both on the ground and in the air, from any form of unlawful interference.
Resolution A17-3 foreshadowed the next action of the international commu-
nity by calling upon States to attend the Diplomatic Conference to be
convened in December of 1970 to consider the draft Convention on hijack-
ing which ultimately became the Hague Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, popularly referred to as the Hague Hijack-
ing Convention. Additionally, in Resolution A17-20 the Extraordinary
Session of the Assembly directed the Council to convene the Legal Com-
mittee if possible by November of 1970 in order to begin work on an
international convention to deal with sabotage which was outside the scope
of the Hague Hijacking Convention. This Resolution was, in fact, the
beginning of the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation 8 of September 1971.
In June of 1970 at the conclusion of the Extraordinary Session of the
Assembly, it appeared as though the international community had done
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everything that it could reasonably be expected to do in order to cope
with the problem of unlawful interference with aircraft. The Diplomatic
Conference on the Hijacking Convention was to be held at The Hague in
December and the Legal Committee was to begin drafting a convention
on sabotage at its London meeting in November. The Assembly had been
able through the hard work and cooperation of its members to develop
technical and operational measures that went into great detail and depth
as to the practical things that could be done to prevent hijacking and
sabotage. It was in effect a guide to prevention given to all. 19 No one
believed that the problem was solved but the general consensus was that
the international community had acted forcibly and well and that matters
should soon improve. Such optimism as there may have been was short-
lived. In September of 1970 came the series of incidents which collectively
have become known as the Dawsons Field incident.
In September of 1970 political blackmail entered the hijacking scene
when three planes, one belonging to TWA, one to Swissair and one to
BOAC were hijacked and taken to an abandoned air strip in Jordan's
Dawsons Field by persons stating that they acted on behalf of the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine. A fourth aircraft, a Pan American
747 was hijacked to Cairo and blown up at the airport. An attempt was
made to hijack a fifth aircraft belonging to El Al but this attempt was
unsuccessful. This action naturally provoked intense activity in the inter-
national community. On 9 September 1970, the Security Council of the
United Nations appealed to all parties concerned for the immediate release
of all passengers and crews, without exception, who were being held as
a result of hijacking and called on States to take all possible legal steps
to prevent additional hijackings. 20
At almost the same time, the President of the United States issued a
statement condemning detention for international blackmail purposes of
passengers, crew and aircraft contrary to Article 11 of the Tokyo Conven-
tion and calling for joint action by the international aviation community
to suspend airline services with countries which refuse to punish or extra-
dite hijackers involved in international blackmail. This was followed by a
request to the Council of ICAO to convene an Extraordinary Session of the
Council to consider the problem presented by the Dawsons Field incident.
At this Extraordinary Session of the Council, the United States, through its
Secretary of Transportation, proposed that the Council adopt a resolution
establishing the basis for concerted action by the international community
to suspend service in any case where an aircraft has been hijacked for
international blackmail purposes. The resolution thus proposed was adopted
on October 1, 1970.21 The pertinent portion of this text is as follows:
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Calls upon Contracting States, in order to ensure the safety and
security of international civil air transport, upon request of a
Contracting State to consult together immediately with a view to
deciding what joint action should be undertaken, in accordance
with international law, without excluding measures such as the
suspension of international civil air transport services to and from
any State which, after the unlawful seizure of an aircraft, detains
passengers, crew of aircraft contrary to the principles of Article
11 of the Tokyo Convention, for international blackmail purposes,
or any State which, contrary to the principles of Articles 7 and 8
of the Draft Convention on Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, fails to
extradite or prosecute persons committing acts of unlawful seizure
for international blackmail purposes. 22
The resolution further directed the Legal Committee to study the
problem and to consider an international convention or other international
instrument to give effect to the purposes set out in the paragraph just
quoted. Work on this matter was undertaken by the Legal Committee at its
session in London in November of 1970, and further work was accom-
plished by a Subcommittee in the early part of 1971. During this study
legal problems arose, among them a question as to the competence of
ICAO to deal with the subject which, in essence, called for the application
of sanctions on the theory that this was a matter within the exclusive
competence of the Security Council of the United Nations under Article 41
of the U.N. Charter. On this question there was a substantial divergence
of views which verged into political as well as legal areas. In any event,
as a result of the controversy, the 18th Assembly of ICAO meeting in
June and July of 1971 decided to instruct the Legal Committee to suspend
work on this particular problem and while it still remains on the work
program of the Legal Committee it is not now under active consideration.
The so-called Hague Hijacking Convention had a much happier end-
ing. Probably due to the impetus arising from the Extraordinary Session
of the ICAO Assembly in June of 1970, the Dawsons Field incident of
September 1970 and the Council's resolution on concerted action in Octo-
ber 1970, the countries meeting in the Hague in December of 1970 to
conclude at a Diplomatic Conference an international convention on the
problem of hijacking, found it relatively easy to reach agreement. The
Hague Convention in essence fills the gaps in the legal system created by
the Tokyo Convention. As earlier noted, the Tokyo Convention did not
make hijacking an international crime, did not require severe penalties
for hijacking, did not call for either extradition or submission of the
offender to prosecution. The Hague Convention does all of these. In
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Article 1, the offense is defined. Article 2 contains an undertaking by
parties to the Convention to make the offense punishable by severe pen-
alties. Article 7 tackles the difficult problem of extradition or prosecution.
It provides that the contracting State having the offender in custody "shall,
if it does not extradite him, be obliged without exception whatsoever and
whether or not the offense was committed in its territory, to submit the
case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution."
2 3
This solution of the problem of political asylum was the matter on
which the Diplomatic Conference had the greatest difficulty in reaching
agreement. As finally drafted, the Convention walks a very narrow ledge
between compulsory extradition on the one hand and complete freedom
of political asylum on the other. It recognizes that some States may wish
to permit political asylum in some form for whatever purposes despite the
gravity of the offense. Thus compulsory extradition was rejected at the
Hague Conference. 24 However, because of the very gravity of the offense
even though the State elects to allow the offender to remain within its
borders the Convention requires contracting States to submit the offender
to its competent authorities for prosecution.25 I am sure that there will be
some cases in which there will be disagreement among States as to whether
the punishment meted out in cases where the offender is not extradited
26
is commensurate with the gravity of the crime. Yet, on the whole, it seems
that this is a reasonable compromise of a very difficult problem. In my
own view, I consider that by and large the courts of most countries in
considering cases of this type will act responsibly and protect the public
interest in determining an appropriate sentence.
The Hague Hijacking Convention has a unique feature which deserves
special mention. By Article 14 it requires contracting States to take such
measures as may be necessary to establish their jurisdiction over the
offense under certain circumstances. The normal circumstances under
which a contracting State would exercise jurisdiction are, of course, those
where the offense is committed on board an aircraft of that State or where
the aircraft on board which the offense is committed lands in its territory
with the offender still on board. Article 4, in paragraph 2, however, goes
further and requires contracting States to take such measures as may be
necessary to establish jurisdiction over the offense in the case where the
alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him.
This has been referred to as the universal jurisdiction provision of the
Hague Hijacking Convention and in that respect harks back to the law of
piracy to which this offense, in the opinion of many, is closely related.
2 7
The Hague Convention became effective on 14 October 1971 and now
(25 April 1972) has 27 States parties to it.
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The Hague Hijacking Convention takes care of the problems of
unlawful interference with aircraft undertaken by persons on board the
aircraft. The Montreal Convention drawn up and signed in September of
1971 takes account of those acts of unlawful interference with international
civil aviation which occur while the aircraft is on the ground or are
committed by persons not on board the aircraft. Article 1 of the Montreal
Convention defines this offense as destruction of aircraft in service, or
causing damage to such an aircraft which renders it incapable of flight,
or which is likely to endanger its safety in flight. The convention offense
includes the placing or causing to be placed on an aircraft a device or
substance likely to destroy the aircraft or render it either incapable or
unsafe for flight. It also includes endangering or destroying air navigation
facilities when such action is likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in
flight. It also includes the communication of information known to be false
which could endanger the safety of aircraft in flight.
The Montreal Convention is designed to parallel the Hague Conven.
tion on Hijacking and as such incorporates the same legal system. In other
words, the State having the offender in its custody must either extradite
him or submit him to its competent authorities for prosecution. The
offenses mentioned must be punishable by severe penalties. A contracting
State is required to establish jurisdiction if the offense is committed in its
territory, against one of its aircraft or if an aircraft on board which the
offense is committed lands in its territory with the offender on board. The
Montreal Convention also calls for the establishment of so-called universal
jurisdiction. The Convention is not yet in effect although there are 40
States who have signed.
In summary, the international community has through multilateral
conventions, two of which are in effect, created a legal system which should
go far to ending the scourge of hijacking and sabotage to aircraft. If
enough States of the world become party to these conventions there will
no longer be so-called safe havens for the hijacker or saboteur, assuming,
of course, that States are responsive to the obligations created in the multi-
lateral conventions to which they have become party. However, until there
is virtually universal adoption and application of these conventions, the
potential of safe havens exists. For that reason, the United States at least
has not been satisfied with the action of the ICAO Assembly in relegating
to the inactive portion of its program the subject of possible concerted
action by interested States in the event that some State does not promptly
and effectively deal with a hijacker within its territory. The U.S. considers
this further step to be necessary and desirable and intends to press forward
with it, Other than that, it appears to me that there can only be praise for
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the way in which the international community, particularly the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization has responded to the grave threat to
international aviation posed by hijacking and sabotage and with the good
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